May 2012 Update on China’s Coal Industry

In 2011, China accounted for 48.18% of the global demand for coal and consumed 3.19 billion tons of coal.

About 90% of coal is consumed by four heavy industries in the world: Power generation sector, steel sector, construction material sector and chemical sector.
In 2011, power generation accounted for 52% of total demand, the steel and construction material sectors consumed 18% and 14% respectively, and the chemical sector consumed 3% of total demand.

These ratios have been stable from 2006 to 2011. Although the electricity sector accounts for the largest share of coal consumption, demand in this sector is subject to electricity demand in other heavy industries, as it provides more than 60% of the electricity used in these heavy industries. As a result, steel and cement sectors have more influence on coal demand than the direct consumption of coal by these sectors would suggest.

Although the declining importance of coal as an energy source may concern the market, the Chinese government plans to use coal for about 60% of energy production in 2020, thus coal will remain the dominant energy source, and its consumption will grow in absolute terms, according to IEA and JP Morgan.

Top coal deals since 2008

China Mining Blog readers can get the full 50 page report at no charge from Censere.

Enhanced by Zemanta

Mongolia Sets Plan to Cap Investments

Oyu Tolgoi project - Copper and Gold Mine in S...
Oyu Tolgoi project – Copper and Gold Mine in South Gobi. Construction of Shaft #2 (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Mongolia’s parliament approved a new investment law Thursday that caps future foreign participation in certain strategic industries, reflecting a growing public push to keep profits from the mineral-rich nation’s industries inside the country.

When it goes into effect, the law will require foreign investors to obtain government review and parliamentary approval for investments at 49% and above into industries such as resources, finance, telecommunications and media, according to analysts in Ulan Bator. The cap is specific to deals valued above about $75 million.

Investors owned by governments, such as state-backed Chinese companies, will also need special permission to buy into the sectors.

Foreign investment is critical to Mongolia’s future as a commodity powerhouse. But the law reflects anxiety among ordinary Mongolians that foreigners would enjoy the spoils of the country’s hoard of coal, copper, gold and other natural resources. Its passage comes weeks before a parliamentary election, the first in four years, for which politicians are expected to campaign on populist promises of ensuring profits are retained in Mongolia.

Dale Choi, chief investment strategist at Frontier Securities in the Mongolian capital, said in a research note Thursday that the legislation would take effect 10 days after its publication unless vetoed by the president.

Full details of the legislation weren’t available Thursday night, but his note said key provisions hadn’t changed since they were published earlier in the week.

The impetus to tighten foreign investment regulations now was spurred by a deal announced in April that would give investors backed by the Chinese government more sway over Mongolian coal reserves.

Still, the final version of the law carries less sting than foreigner investors had initially feared, in part because it wouldn’t be retroactive.

“Foreign investment should continue to be the lifeblood of Mongolia’s strong mining-sector ramp-up,” Jim Dwyer, executive director of the 220-member Business Council of Mongolia, said by email.

Ahead of Thursday’s vote, analysts also predicted revisions are possible once a new parliament is sitting.

Previously, Mongolia set few hard limits on foreign investments. In the all-important mining sector, the government had previously wanted about 34% of strategic mineral deposits that were developed privately, and retained stakes of up to 51% on others, including uranium mines, according to the business council.

Historically known for nomadic ranchers who produced cashmere, Mongolia is increasingly known for its coal.

Driving the economy is major mining under way near the border with China, the expected buyer for the mineral output.

But in the landlocked country, which broke from Soviet influence just over two decades ago and formed a democracy, China also makes some Mongolians nervous for its size and influence.

Mongolia’s key mine projects remain in their infancy. The projects are already drawing foreign investment, which has pushed gross domestic product growth rates above 16% in recent quarters. But the nation’s increasingly urban and still-poor population so far sees limited trickle down, making it a key issue going into elections.

Specifically spurring momentum for a foreign investment law, according to analysts, was an April 1 deal by Rio Tinto Ltd.-controlled Ivanhoe Mines Ltd. to sell a large stake in a coal company to a state-owned Chinese investor. Under that plan, Aluminum Corp. of China, ACH -1.46% or Chalco, would pay over $920 million to buy up to 60% in coal producer SouthGobi Resources Ltd., 1878.HK -1.31% already about 14%-owned by the sovereign-wealth fund of China, China Investment Corp.

SouthGobi, which sits on roughly 800 million metric tons of coal, said some of its mine licenses were suspended by local authorities after the China deal was proposed. Chalco took another step into Mongolia days later, buying control of Winsway Coking Coal Holdings Ltd., 1733.HK -3.68% another coal miner.

Two other mine projects are worth hundreds of billions of dollars and don’t appear immediately impacted by the new legislation, namely a copper and gold project called Oyu Tolgoi, controlled by Rio Tinto and Tavan Tolgoi, which is being privatized with a structure in line with the new legislation.

Enhanced by Zemanta

Yitai Coal to tap market for US$1.5b

Inner Mongolia Yitai Coal, one of the biggest coal producers on the mainland, plans to raise up to US$1.5 billion from an initial public offering in Hong Kong this year, making it the country’s first B-share company to issue H shares.

The company said on Thursday it had received approval from the China Securities Regulatory Commission, but has yet to get clearance from the Hong Kong stock exchange.

Yitai Coal plans to issue up to 297 million H shares, including an oversubscription quota of 38.8 million shares, to raise between US$1 billion and US$1.5 billion.It first applied for permission from the CSRC in May 2010, and filed applications with the Hong Kong exchange in June 2010, and in January and August last year, renewing the application every six months when it expired.

BNP Paribas, mainland investment bank China International Capital Corp, BOC (SEHK: 3988)International and UBS are involved in the share offering.

Yitai Coal already lists B shares on the mainland, after it was spun off by state-owned Inner Mongolia Yitai Group on the Shanghai stock market to raise 520 million yuan (HK$640 million).

B shares are issued by mainland companies and traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in foreign currencies such as US or Hong Kong dollars.

They were limited to foreign investors until 2001, when the CSRC allowed mainland investors to trade B shares in the secondary market.

The B-share markets are normally inactive because of the many restrictions. There are only 54 B-share companies on the Shanghai exchange, and fewer than 60 listed on the Shenzhen exchange.

H shares are issued by mainland-incorporated companies listed in Hong Kong. They are denominated in Hong Kong dollars.

Yitai Coal recorded net profit of 5.5 billion yuan for last year, compared with 5.1 billion yuan in the previous year. Revenue rose to 16.84 billion yuan from14.08 billion yuan. Profit margin fell to 32.6 per cent from 35.8 per cent.

Its major shareholders include many of the Hong Kong branches of mainland securities firms, including Guotai Junan Securities, China Merchants Securities and First Shanghai Securities.

Brokers are sceptical about the demand for Yitai Coal shares, with investors still in “shock” over a spate of auditor resignations from mainland companies listed in Hong Kong, including children’s apparel company Boshiwa International, high-end fashion retailer Ports Design(SEHK: 0589) and Daiqing Dairy.

The market is also expecting another report from short-seller Muddy Waters, whose reports sparked a slump last year in the share price of US-listed Sino Forest. Muddy Waters published a report this week alleging that there was a “fraud school” on the mainland run by lawyers, auditors and consultants to teach companies how to fake accounts.

Yitai Coal shares closed barely changed at US$5.697 yesterday.

Enhanced by Zemanta

Chalco to buy coal miner SouthGobi

Logo for Ivanhoe Mines Limited

Logo for Ivanhoe Mines Limited (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Aluminium Corporation of China (Chalco (SEHK: 2600)), the world’s third-largest producer of the lightweight industrial metal, has offered to buy up to 60 per cent of Mongolian coal-mining firm SouthGobi Resources for HK$7.2 billion, in its first mining investment in Mongolia.

The company yesterday announced it had made a conditional offer of C$8.48 or HK$65.97 in cash for each of SouthGobi’s Canada- and Hong Kong-listed shares, for up to 181.86 million shares. This translates into a 28.9 per cent premium on the share’s Hong Kong closing price on Friday. SouthGobi’s 57.6 per cent majority shareholder Canada-based Ivanhoe Mines has agreed to tender all its shares to the offer.

Chalco has for a few years indicated its intention to diversify away from the low-profit and sometimes loss-making aluminium business due to industry overcapacity and rising electricity costs, although analysts are divided over whether it is overpaying for the stake. It has a joint venture iron-ore development project with Rio Tinto in Guinea, Africa.Chalco also agreed to buy coal at market prices from SouthGobi for two years, and help SouthGobi procure electricity. SouthGobi’s mine is near China’s border with Mongolia.

“The offer price is 13 times its estimated earnings in 2013, while Mongolian Mining, [part of private conglomerate MCS Group], which has better connections with the Mongolian government, is fetching only 8.5 times 2013 earnings,” said a mining analyst who asked not to be named.

SouthGobi’s faster planned output growth means both firms are trading at around 6.5 times their 2014 forecast earnings, although SouthGobi has higher execution risk on its output ramp-up, given it experienced water, power and logistics-capacity shortages, whereas Mongolian Mining had been able to cope with these challenges thanks to government help, he said.

“Ivanhoe has been trying to sell its SouthGobi stake for over a year, it previously approached several state-backed mainland coal miners like Shenhua Group and China National Coal,” he said.

“To help SouthGobi, Chalco will have to work on the Mongolian government, but even China’s largest coal producer Shenhua hasn’t been able to complete an investment deal in the Tavan Tolgoi coal project in Mongolia after 10 years of effort. I don’t see how Chalco can do better.”

SouthGobi chief executive Alex Molyneux declined to comment on which firms Ivanhoe has approached, only saying it had gone though an informal sale process and talked to various potential buyers in China and North America.

UOB Kay Hian Securities analyst Helen Lau said the offer price was in line with her estimate of fair value for SouthGobi’s shares, based on her calculation of the present value of future cash flows of its projects.

“The market has given a discount to the offer price today, because of the uncertainty on whether SouthGobi’s existing management will leave after the one-year [integration and transition period] and the fact that the formal offer has not been launched,” she said.

Chalco shares fell 1.9 per cent to HK$3.67. SouthGobi surged 18.2 per cent to HK$60.5, 8.3 per cent below the offer price.

CLSA Securities head of resources research Andrew Driscoll said this reflected investors’ concern about Chalco’s high net debt-to-equity, which he predicted would rise to 156 per cent after the deal from 139 per cent last year. “But as a large state firm, it should not have problems financing the deal,” he said.

Molyneux said although Chalco’s main business was aluminium smelting in China, it last year signed a contract to buy coal from state-owned miner Erdenes Tavan Tolgoi, and that it has experience sourcing and moving coal in northern China.

Enhanced by Zemanta

Have Australian authorities finally learned their lesson?

Australia’s corporate regulator, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, has succeeded in a bid to stop Hanlong Mining’s former vice president, Calvin Zhu, from leaving the country.

Mr Zhu, who is one of a number of Hanlong executives under investigation for alleged insider trading, had planned to travel to China tomorrow under a restricted travel regime which had been agreed to by the court last month.

Justice Michael Slattery of the NSW Supreme Court said Mr Zhu’s request to travel to China to give an account to his in-laws about his situation was less than compelling. And he said the failure of Mr Zhu’s colleague, Hanlong’s former managing director Steven Xiao, to return to Australia under the restricted travel regime was a material change in circumstance.

Justice Slattery agreed to ASIC‘s request to vary the travel regime, and restrain Mr Zhu from leaving Australia.

Earlier, ASIC officially conceded that Mr Xiao had abandoned his wife and children, and fled the jurisdiction to avoid the consequences of the ongoing investigation.

Its position on Mr Xiao was revealed in the NSW Supreme Court today, as it sought to Mr Zhu from travelling to China to visit family this weekend.

Advertisement: Story continues below

ASIC is probing the alleged insider trading by the executives in Australian mining companies that were the subject of takeovers by Hanlong.

While previous court appearances have couched Mr Xiao’s actions as a “failure to return to Australia”, ASIC today put on the record that Mr Xiao has “fled the jurisdiction”.

Mr Xiao had been given permission to travel to China in late November to give an oral presentation of his doctoral thesis, “Research on project risk control of Chinese mining enterprises transnational investment”.

In an affidavit, ASIC investigator Colin Luxford said he had twice spoken with the professor who was supervising Mr Xiao at Wuhan University of Technology in the central Chinese province of Hubei.

Mr Xiao had proffered to the court an email “purporting” that he must attend the university in person on November 25, Mr Luxford said. However the professor said he had not seen Mr Xiao, and his last communication, via email, was in early November.

Enhanced by Zemanta

The Hanlong saga continues…

TWO more executives of Hanlong Mining have been caught up in the corporate regulator’s investigation into alleged insider trading in Australian mining companies Bannerman and Sundance resources.

The regulator has also alleged Hanlong’s former vice-president Calvin Zhu used $1 million of Hanlong company money to trade in derivatives of the Australian miners – with the profits and more than $925,000 of Hanlong money going into offshore accounts held by him and others.

Details of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission investigation emerged during an urgent hearing before duty judge Michael Slattery in the NSW Supreme Court late yesterday afternoon as ASIC sought to stop Mr Zhu from flying to China this weekend to visit family.

In his affidavit tendered in court, Mr Zhu questioned why ASIC had not sought travel restrictions against two other executives it ”suspects” of having been involved in insider trading of Bannerman and Sundance shares and contracts for difference.

Mr Zhu said a letter from ASIC to his solicitors identified those executives as ”Mr Nelson Feng Chen, a director of Hanlong (Australia) Resources Pty Ltd and Hanlong Mining Investment Pty Ltd; and Mr Simon Yang, the CFO of Hanlong Mining Investment Ltd”.

”To the best of my knowledge and belief [ASIC] has not to date taken any steps to restrain Mr Chen or Mr Yang from leaving Australia,” he said.

”[ASIC] has given no explanation as to why it considers they are not a flight risk, whereas I am.”

Counsel for ASIC David Stack alleged Mr Zhu was at risk of absconding. He said while Mr Zhu had claimed he was nominee trading for Hanlong, the disbursement of money created a problem for that explanation. He said $1 million was

transferred from Hanlong Metals to a company controlled by Mr Zhu, Wingatta, which made a profit of more than $1 million in trading Sundance CFDs, allegedly through Mr Zhu’s inside knowledge of Hanlong’s planned takeover of Sundance.

”Company moneys were used to fund the CFD [trades] but the company’s funds, and the profits, were then dispersed to everyone other than the company,” Mr Stack said. ”The company received $76,000.”

Mr Zhu is entitled, under a restricted travel regime put in place by the court in September, to travel overseas. One of the conditions is that his wife, Nancy Wang, surrender her passport and remain in the country. Mr Zhu said in his affidavit that his wife was not under investigation by ASIC.

ASIC’s attempt to prevent Mr Zhu leaving the country comes on the heels of the failure of Hanlong’s former managing director, Steven Hui Xiao, to return in November from what should have been a brief visit to China.

There are asset preservation and travel restriction orders against the original five identified by ASIC: Mr Xiao and his wife Xike Hu, Mr Zhu, Hanlong trading manager Fan Zhang, and a family friend of Mr Zhu, Fan Fan Chen.

The hearing continues tomorrow.

Read more: http://www.smh.com.au/business/asic-probe-snares-two-more-hanlong-executives-20111221-1p5mu.html#ixzz1hC4NGrnn

Enhanced by Zemanta

Adventures with Real Gold

On 11 July 2011, Real Gold Mining Limited (00246.HK) was removed from Hang Seng Composite Index, Hang Seng 
Composite SmallCap Index, and Hang Seng Composite Industry Index – Materials.

There was a hint in the announcement from Hang Seng Index Services on June 29th: Real Gold Mining Limited “has been suspended from trading and has not yet resumed”.

Hong Kong media already had their suspicions about Real Gold after it was involved in manipulation of stock prices, financial fraud and frequent personnel changes.

The significance of the problem is not only limited to these reported problems. I work as an investigative reporter for the China Economic Times and have found through field investigations and interviews that there is no sign of operation and production in the core assets of Real Gold, and many of these assets have deal-breaker problems according to several local government departments who stated that there are a number of issues such as a very low ore grade/tenor, expired licenses and incomplete formal procedures, etc. Two of the five clients mentioned in the prospectus said that “we absolutely do not and have not ever had any business relationship with Real Gold”.

Has Real Gold been blatantly fraudulent?

The plot thickened in July with Real Gold, already suspended from trading, having further claims made against them.

China Economic Times received an anonymous tip that three of Real Gold’s gold mines never actually went into production since day one, and all financial data during the period when the company was public was faked. Meanwhile, Wu Ruilin, the actual holder of the company controls several other listed companies, behind which there is a complete chain of forgery and fraud, “their aim is simply to expropriate money through fraud”.

As early as in 1999, Cosun Telephone Company owned by Cosun Group controlled by Wu Ruilin went public on Nasdaq; in 2007, Cosun Mobile Company, which is wholly owned by Consun Telephone Compnay went public on the NYSE, through which CECT became the first domestic [Chinese] mobile phone company to go public on the NYSE.

Real Gold went public in Hong Kong on 23 February 2009, raising more than seven hundred million Hong Kong dollars. Disclosed material indicates that the company is engaged in gold mining and processing of ore and other minerals. Statistics show that the gold profit is the main source of the overall profit for this company: it accounted for 89% in 2007, 71% in 2008, 66.1% in 2009 and 64.1% in 2010. The main source of revenue is three gold mines located in Chifeng Municipality in Inner Mongolia, namely the Shirengou Gold Mine, the Nantaizi Gold Mine and the Luotuochang Gold Mine. Besides Inner Mongolia, Cosun Group also aspires to build a mining enterprise covering Xinjiang, Guangxi, Yunan and Jiangxi, conducting exploration and development of mineral resources such as gold, nonferrous metals, coal, etc.

In order to see what’s really going on, this journalist went to Chifeng Municipality in Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region for investigation.

Nantaizi Gold Mine

50 tons? 300 tons? 1,480 tons? There are different versions of ore processing capability for this mine depending on who you ask.

Are they stealing ore? Are there sales contracts? Large-scale production or small scale? Is this even a real operation? There are differing arguments for all of these cases.

It is the morning of the 18th of July and I’m at Shirengou village in Songshan District, Chifeng Municipality.

After an hour’s journey on substandard roads, yours truly finally arrived the Nantaizi Gold Mine located in Guan Cungou Village, Xiao Niuqun Town, Kalaqin, Chifeng Municipality.

Two women were separating ore, a small electric tricycle with full load of ore was parked alongside; In the work shed next to the mine entrance, there were several workers who were busy with the logistics of the mine, a “supervisor” sat by the side. This was the first scene of the Nantaizi Gold Mine that came into the journalist’s view.

“We are contractors at the mine so we need to pay the mine every year.” the site administrator told me, produced ore is processed by the contractors instead of being processed in the nearby separation plant. The ore is owned by them and has nothing to do with the company, they simply pay the mine for the right to extract and process the ore.

Further down the road, I found the ore dressing plant owned by Real Gold, where there was only a bulldozer working on an area the size of half a football pitch and nobody else was present. In the living quarters I saw only a few workers came to the dining hall for lunch.

According to the 2009 annual report of the company, the ore processing capacity of the facilities at Nantaizi Gold Mine was 900 tons [a day] from January 2009 to October 2009. From November, the capability increased to 1,480 tons per day. The annual volume of processed ore is 351,500 tons.

If this is really the case, then why does the scene I am presented with here seem quite different? Relevant government departments have their own opinions.

In the afternoon on 19 July, Kang Xiangxin, chief of the mines safety supervision and management bureau at Kalaqin told me the following: “There are two systems at the Nantaizi Gold Mine, one has been put into production while the other one is under construction. The production system is Nantaizi Gold Mine located in Guan Cungou Village with a mine safety license; the one under construction is Li Shugou Gold Mine, this mine does not have a mine safety license.”

“All mining must be equipped with an appropriate sized separation plant and tailings reservoir.” A group leader called Kang from the same department told me. “The two systems at Nantaizi Gold Mine share one tailings reservoir, the designed capability of which ranges from 100 tons to 300 tons. The processing capacity should be fairly close. The processing capability of the separation plant is definitely bigger than 100 tons and smaller than 500 tons.”

He told me that any production at the other mine, where there is no current mine safety license, cannot be regarded as legal production. Extraction systems have not been completed, and the tailings reservoir has not been accepted, which means that the mine is not legally able to produce any ore.

From the data obtained from the environmental impact report on Nantaizi Gold, this dressing plant can process 90,000 tons of ore, in other words, 300 tons each day.

The informant working with us doubts the authenticity of the appraiser for the environmental impact report, “the signature on the report has been copied from some other place by the company”. When I asked the Environmental Protection Bureau of Chifeng Municipality they denied this assertion, “it is unlikely that the company forged the signature.”

When I asked whether the company is currently producing, Kang said that “the operation of the mine is not in the jurisdiction of the mines safety department”.

“The daily dressing capability of this ore separation plant is merely 50 tons” the informant told me, “the few people you see here actually just came here to steal the ore. The company is not currently in production”, there is no formal production of ore, and there are no workers in the ore separation plant.

Shirengou Gold Mine

“There has not actually been much mining over the last two years” the environmental Protection Department said, “It is in production, but the daily production of ore is about 166 tons per day”. The overall output of gold reported to the lands department was 107,800 ounces in total, and increased by 18% than that of 2009- 2010 according to the annual report

The prospectus indicates that Shirengou Gold Mine and Nantaizi Gold Mine are adjacent to each other. Actually, Shirengou Gold Mine is located in Songshan district, Chifeng Municipality, but shares a separation plant together with Nantaizi Gold Mine.

In the afternoon on 18 July, I went to the Nantaizi Gold Mine again by taxi and wanted to learn the situation in Shirengou Gold Mine indirectly.

The visit in the morning might have caused extra vigilance of the mine personnel; the gate of Nantaizi Gold Mine was closed. When I tried to talk with the doorkeeper, someone came out and took a picture of the license plate of the taxi and my face. I went back to Chifeng Municipality. I have been followed everywhere I go since then, even when I asked the police for an escort, but I pursued.

“There is an ore dressing plant and tailings reservoir, however, the equipment is fairly old. The processing capability of the dressing plant is 100 tons per day” Wang, Director of Songshan district branch of the environmental protection bureau told me. However, director Wang indicated that he didn’t know in detail what the capacity of the tailings reservoir is, “There has not actually been much mining activity for the last two years. What can I tell you? They are prospecting all the time and they are taking a terribly long time dragging it out”

On 19th July, I noticed that the registered capital of Shirengou Gold Mine was 600,000 RMB in the Industry and Commerce Bureau of Songshan district in Chifeng Municipality. It was established on 10th Nov 2004, with approved date of 26th October 2009. Director Tian of this Bureau told me that the company has done the annual renewal.

In the afternoon on 22nd of July, Mr. Li, mining management team leader at Land and Resources Bureau (Songshan Branch) told me that Shirengou Gold Mine is under production, with an annual production output of 60,000 tons, that is 166 tons of mined ores per day.

Real Gold’s Annual Report in 2010 indicated that the company has earned a profit of 1.37 billion Yuan, with a year-on-year increase of 35%; gross profit increased by 41% to 1.06 billion yuan with a gross profit rate of 77%; overall output of gold produced by Shirengou-Nantaizi totaled about 107,800 ounces, with an increase of 18% than that in 2009, gold produced by Luotuochang Gold Mine totaled about 28,300 ounces, with an increase of 11% than that of 2009.

Luotuochang Gold Mine

Local governmental departments have different ideas about this mine’s performance.

“The mine hasn’t been operating for several years due to poor grade of the ore.” as stated by the Environmental Administration.

“[Legally] the mine should have been [but hasn't been] producing gold since day 1 when the license was approved.” according to the local Administration of Mine Safety.

The annual report published in 2009 [by Real Gold] claimed it’s a different story. The report said that Luotuochang Gold Mine’s production capacity had increased to about 1,100 tons per day, and that the total amount of processed ore was around 288,400 tons that year.

Our reporters launched their investigation from Chifeng city, Inner Mongolia, to find out what the real story is.

On the morning of July 21st, it was raining heavily. After driving through the winding hills, with the help from a company insider, our reporters finally arrived at Luotuochang village in Balinzuo Qi, where one of Real Gold’s mines, Luotuochang Gold Mine, is located.

Two rows of lightly constructed brick houses and several other facilities, which were placed randomly around the pitheads, were visible at the mine. It was deathly quiet when the reporters arrived.

The insider quipped: “Even if the mine is still in operation, where’s the ore? Where are the processing facilities? And even if the ore exists, how is it being transported?”

Yesterday afternoon, Wang Xueyong, the chief of Balinzuo Qi Bureau of Land and Resources’ Mine Management unit, told reporters that Luotuochang Gold Mine had been out of operation for several years because of a lack of production, and there was only one guard working for the mine. He also said: “What the company does once in a while is to spruce up the mining area a bit.” On the same afternoon, Hu, Balinzuo Qi Bureau of Environmental Protection’s Chief, told reporters that the mine had been closed for 2 years, since 2010. He wasn’t sure about the situation before 2010 because he wasn’t working for the bureau then. Hu agrees that the reason for the mine being shut is because of a lack of production [unable to produce enough gold to be economically viable].

Chief Wang of Balinzuo Qi Bureau of Mine Safety told reporters: “I recall that Luotuochang mine does currently have an operating license, so it can be mined. Licenses are available to mines that are legal and safe.”

But what the company provided to the public is totally different information.

The 2009 Annual Report states that the daily quantity of desirable ore that Luotuochang Gold Mine was able to separate out was about 800 tons. The figure rose to 1100 tons in October. The total quantity of processed ore for the year was 288,400 tons. Gold output for the year was around 116,800 ounces, and the equivalent gold output was around 177,200 ounces. The average selling price for gold was 839.6 USD per ounce throughout the year. If the mine was closed for 2 years, where did these exuberant figures come from?

In Real Gold Mining Limited Company’s prospectus, the two rows of brick bungalows, mentioned earlier, were described as an industrial complex. The complex covered 2,668,000 square meters, and was said to have several well-equipped buildings, which were finished in 2008. The buildings included one research center, one tailings dam, one crude ore bin, and one fine ore bin. The supporting facilities included a boiler house and a bore-water-production house. In the prospectus, total expenses for the mine in 2008 was 47.74 million RMB.

Our insider told us: “These are obviously false claims and were made to exaggerate the company’s outlook before it went public.”

Being shocked at how the gold mine actually looked, people started to have doubts about the all 3 mines. The form below includes the licenses, permits and legal documents that Real Gold Mining Limited claimed in the prospectus.

The environmental protection license for all 3 gold mines have expired. Both Nantaizi Gold Mine’s production and business licenses have expired. Luotuochang Gold Mine’s mining permit has expired. Also, the safety production permit is about to expire. Ironically, all the representatives from relevant governmental branches for the city said that the company had valid licenses as well as legal documents.

One thing that is also confusing is the efforts that Inner Mongolia’s Bureau of Land and Resources are taking to renew Luotuochang Gold Mine’s related licenses. They are ignoring the facts that the mine has been closed for a long time and the mining license has been expired for 5 months. In order to renew Luotuochang mine’s mining license, the Bureau of Land and Resources in Chifeng City commissioned Inner Mongolian Kerui Assets Appraisal to evaluate the mine’s assets, and created the document “No.013 Appraisal by Inner Mongolian Kerui Assets Appraisal Limited 2010“.

The conclusion of the evaluation was that until November 30th 2010, Luotuochang Gold Mine’s partial assets, amounted to 242,300 RMB. The report was supposed to be carefully produced by the appraisal company, who is required to follow the national codes of practice, and use appropriate evaluation methods and indexes.

Why bother renewing the mining license if the mines are no longer in operation? Wang, the Mine Management Unit’s chief for the Balinzuo Qi Bureau of Land and Resources, replied that it was because the company paid for the mineral resource compensation fee.

A Real Gold staffer explained to reporters that in order to renew the license, the company needed to hand in 242,300 RMB to the Bureau of Land and Resources and report to the Bureau that the mine’s deposits will allow for a higher level of production than is actually possible. This provides a perfect opportunity for the company to lie to investors concerning the levels of their gold reserves.

Similar cases happen regularly in government environmental protection and water conservancy departments too.

The Real Gold Mining Limited Company Prospectus said that up till December 31st 2008, the cost of environmental protection for the year was 1.743 million RMB. The prospectus also projected the cost to be 8.9 million RMB and 10.9 million RMB in 2009 and 2010, respectively. However, the environmental protection bureau for the city wouldn’t acknowledge these figures.

The unpublished material recorded by Chifeng Water Conservancy Department indicated that Luotuochang Gold Mine would have to pay another 4.1811 million RMB. This would cover the cost of conserving topsoil and water for mining and processing. The standard was set to be 150 tons per day. Also, the Water Conservancy Department would get another 8.3644 million RMB from Nantaizi Gold Mine for soil and water conservation at the standard of 300 tons per day. But the department would not confirm the figures.

A local insider told reporters: “All the supervisory departments are getting what they want. So none of the departments are willing to investigate. That’s the reason why Real Gold wasn’t questioned.”

Who is responsible?

Aside from the supervising departments, some geological exploration and mining consultancies are also to blame for this scandal.  The irresponsible behavior of mining consultancies had an even worse effect [than the government departments].

The Independent Technical Report (ITR) was produced by Behre Dolbear Asia, an international mining consultancy group. The report states that Shirengou Gold Mine and Nantaizi Gold Mine hired Liaoning Geological Exploration Institute to explore the two mines in August 2006. The exploration reports of the two deposits were submitted in September 2007. The reports had an updated estimate about the mineral resources. In October 2006, Real Gold Mining Limited Company bought Luotuochang Gold Mine from a personal proprietor, and hired Liaoning Geological Exploration Institute again to do two surveys. One survey was started in August 2006, and ended in June 2007. The other survey was started in July 2007, and ended in September 2007.

The Independent Technical Report indicated that the Liaoning Geological Exploration Institute calculated the mining assets for the three gold mines on July 31st 2007.

After the Liaoning Geological Exploration Institute was finished, Chifeng Shengyuan Geological Exploration Limited produced another 3 detailed exploration reports for Real Gold.

“Yes, we did the reports. We received the information from the mines around 2008, and started exploring the deposits afterwards. We also went to the sites to confirm information such as proven reserves and roadways. The result showed that most data in the original reports was correct. After revising the original reports, we had them reviewed and recorded. They were reviewed by the experts [Behre Dolbear], and recorded by the Department of Land Resource in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.” according to Mr. Wang, a manager at Chifeng Shengyuan Geological Exploration Limited.

Insiders have a different take: “Real Gold hired two companies to do geological reports for the same mines. The intention behind this was to increase the reserves by substituting real data with fake data.”

The insider had more to say: “The reports would be revised dozens of times to create fake information, but laymen investors wouldn’t be able to detect the fraud because of the technicality inherent in the subject. Chifeng Shengyuan revised the detailed report for Shirengou Gold Mine, but they won’t give you the original one that they made changes to. You would have to go to the Record Office in Inner Mongolia’s Department of Land and Resources to search for it and find out that it wasn’t even recorded.”

Mr. Wang denied the reporters request to see the detailed reports that his company made.

It is well known that mining consultancies are usually not allowed to go to the real mine sites that they are hired to do reporting on. Mining companies would take them to other mining sites instead.

Tip of the iceberg

Real Gold no longer operates [these mines]; but its [reported] business performance [for these mines] is improving rapidly.

Real Gold’s annual reports said that sales revenue of the 3 mines was 312 million RMB in 2008; 1.011 billion RMB in 2009; 1.368 billion RMB in 2010. The annual reports also explained that profit growth in 2008 should be attributed to the investment that was made in Nantaizi Gold Mine and Luotuochang Gold Mine, which boosted sales. Profit growth in 2009 should be attributed to the additional construction in Nantaizi Gold Mine and Luotuochang Gold Mine. The company’s net profit in the first quarter 2011 was 178 million RMB, which increased 39.7% year to year.

The company attributed the amazing business performance to investment and additional construction, but this is absolutely contrary to what the reporters witnessed during the investigations.

Although the company did mention a temporary stay of operations for no longer than 25 days starting from June 18th, reporters found that in the 2010 annual report, neither Nantaizi nor Luotuochang were mentioned. In 2008 and 2009 annual reports, both gold mines were described in detail. The reporters also found questionable information concerning the company’s 5 major clients, who were mentioned in the prospectus. The 5 major clients were Liaoning Xindu Gold Limited Company, Henan Yuguang Gold and Lead Limited (600531), Chifeng Kumbahongye Zinc Limited Company, Chifeng Baiyinnuo’er Lead and Zinc Factory and Chifeng Fubang Copper Limited.

The fact that no specific sales volumes regarding these clients were revealed in the annual reports raised a red flag. The more ironic thing is that when we called up Liaoning Xindu Gold Limited Company and Henan Yuguang Gold and Lead Limited Company to confirm their business relationships with Real Gold Mining Limited Company, they were out rightly told that no business relationships exist.  Only Chifeng Fubang Copper Limited Company states they are a customer.

“All the data including the financial statements were fabricated.” a local insider leaked to reporters: “The relationships with 4 out of the 5 major clients were counterfeit. Think about it, they didn’t have real clients to do business with. Where did they get the contracts, receipts, and transaction records from banks? They were all fake.”

Current employees at Real Gold told reporters that the company indeed had some problems, but they didn’t clarify what the problems were.

This is how Wu Ruilin, the owner of Real Gold, operates. Could this just be the tip of the iceberg?

Original produced by the China Economic Times, Translated into English by Transeam Mining Translation.

Chinese Police Detain Boss Who Faked Being Trapped With Miners

Chinese police detained a mine boss who smeared coal on his face to pretend he had been in the shaft where 34 miners died and nine are still trapped, state media said Monday.

Mine bosses who don’t go underground with their workers face severe punishments under a rule imposed last year to improve safety. Chinese mines are still the world’s most dangerous, though death rates have been lowered significantly.

A powerful gas leak at the Sizhuang Coal Mine in Yunnan province Thursday trapped 43 miners. Thirty-four bodies have been recovered, while rescuers were still trying to reach nine miners still trapped Monday. Gas inside the mine and the risk of explosions were hampering efforts, Xinhua News Agency said. The People’s Daily reported that Qi Guming, deputy head of the coal mine, has been taken into custody on suspicion of faking evidence, citing a briefing by the rescue command office.

After the accident, Qi “rushed down the shaft and smeared coal on his face to pretend he had escaped from underground,” the newspaper said. “On Sunday … the public security authority confirmed that Qi did not go down the shaft on that day, and made false claims to the rescue command office.” The regulation that took effect last year calls for mines that violate the rules to pay between 150,000 and 5 million yuan ($22,400 to $750,000) in fines, depending on whether the mine also suffers serious accidents. Bosses can be fined between 10,000 yuan ($1,500) and up to 80 percent of their income from the previous year and face a lifetime ban on mine supervision work.

Xinhua has said that the Sizhuang Coal Mine’s license was revoked in April and that it was operating illegally. The incident was China’s second deadly mining accident in less than a week. In the previous accident, eight miners died and 52 were rescued from a mine in Henan province after a cave-in. And on Monday, rescuers were pumping water out of a coal mine that flooded early Sunday in northwestern Gansu province, trapping seven workers. The miners still have not been located and it is not known whether they are alive, Xinhua quoted Fan Shijie, chief of the local work safety supervisory management bureau, as saying. Fan said coal mine managers there failed to work underground as required, and further investigation was under way.

China closed many smaller, illegal mines in recent years as part of its safety efforts. Annual fatalities are now about one-third of the high of nearly 7,000 in 2002.

Real Gold Mining appoints INED with dodgy PhD

Still embroiled in investigations and in the suspension deep-freeze on SEHK, Real Gold Mining Ltd (RGM, 0246) has been scraping around to find itself another independent non-executive director to make up the quota of three. The result is Mr Li Xiaoping, appointed yesterday. The announcement tells us that:

“He was awarded the doctorate degree in business administration (PH.D) from InterAmerican University in 2010.”

RGM doesn’t say where InterAmerican University (IAU) is, but our best guess is this one, at the domain iauniversity.net, which is registered to one Angel Fernandez of the town of Luarca, Asturias, in northern Spain. There is also another domain, inuniversityedu.net, which hosts a very similar web site for IAU. That domain is registered to “guangjun zhong” of Beijing.

We’ll just use the first site in this article as they are nearly identical. “Dr Angel Fernandez” is listed on the site as President of the University. On its accreditation page, IAU says that it is “globally accredited” by the “International Association of Universities and Schools” (IAUS) and the “International Council on Education” (ICE). On its contact page, IAU gives an address in New York.

The Michigan Government warns that IAUS is not approved by the US Department of Education and therefore any so-called “accreditation” by IAUS is meaningless. In other words, IAUS is an accreditation mill. The Oregon Office of Degree Authorization contains a similar warning and states that IAUS is based in Switzerland. We could not find a web site for IAUS, except for this page on Angelfire. We could not find a web site for ICE, or any government that recognises it. The US Council on Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA) does not recognise IAUS or ICE.

In short, then, IAU has no accreditation recognised by the US Federal government, and we’re calling it a diploma mill. So Real Gold’s new INED has a somewhat unreal PhD. IAU also lists affiliates, one of which is “INTERAMERICAN UNIVERSITY ASIA”. This has its own web site in Chinese. There’s also an affiliate in Malaysia.

And there’s one more

Mr Li (at least RGM has the decency not to call him Doctor) is not the only director of a HK-listed company who has a degree from IAU. We found one other. Ms Wang Xiang, a non-executive director of Shanghai Qingpu Fire-Fighting Equipment Co. Ltd (8115), holds an MBA from IAU, according to page 10 of the 2010 annual report.

Further afield, the Borneo Post reports on 17-Dec-2010 that Dato Lau Siu Wai has been awarded an honorary PhD in Project Management by IAU along with a top-10 something-or-other award, and there’s a picture of him receiving the award from one Dr Angel Fernandez.

Enhanced by Zemanta

Hanlong Mining probed for insider trading in takeover targets

Australia’s corporate watchdog has launched an insider-trading probe into several executives of private Chinese firm Hanlong Mining.

That has sparked a slump in the shares of two mining firms which had received takeover proposals from Hanlong.

The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) said a local court had restricted the travel of Hanlong Mining’s managing director in connection with its investigation of suspected insider trading in shares of Sundance Resources and Bannerman Resources.

It also froze the assets of Steven Hui Xiao, a Chinese citizen.

Four other people, including two other employees of Hanlong, the Australian unit of Sichuan Hanlong Group, also had travel restricted and assets frozen under the court order.

Hanlong said Xiao and the two other employees had stood down pending the outcome of the investigation and an executive from Hanlong Mining’s parent was going to Sydney to run the company’s operations.

Shares of Sundance and Bannerman fell 15 per cent and 11 per cent respectively yesterday on worries over the fate of the takeover proposals from Hanlong.

Some high-profile Chinese resource sector deals in Australia have failed in the past few years, leading to a belief among Chinese investors that Australia discriminates against them, a report by the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney said in June.

A 2009 bid by state-owned Chinalco, China’s top aluminium producer, to take a significant stake in Rio Tinto was abandoned. In the same year, China Non-Ferrous Metal Mining was blocked from buying a controlling stake in rare earths miner Lynas Corporation.

Sundance, which received a US$1.5 billion takeover proposal from Hanlong in July, said it remained in advanced talks with the Chinese firm and other parties over the development of its US$4.6 billion iron ore project in Africa.

Hanlong owns an 18.6 per cent stake in Sundance and proposed a 50 cent per share offer for the company.

Sundance said it was in advanced negotiations with Hanlong Mining and other interested parties with regards to the development of the Mbalam Iron Ore Project in Cameroon and Congo. A Hanlong spokesman said the company was looking forward to continuing discussions with Sundance.

Hanlong is waiting for the Cameroon and Congo governments to approve Sundance’s Mbalam project before moving forward with a bid.

Sundance shares fell more than 15 per cent in early trade. The stock ended down 10 per cent at 40 cents.

“[With the investigation], the bid may not be there at 50 cents, I guess that’s what investors are concerned about,” said Martin Angel, a dealer at Patersons Securities.

Bannerman, which is subject to a A$144 million takeover proposal from Hanlong, said it was also continuing to engage in talks with the Chinese mining firm.

Enhanced by Zemanta